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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Keun Jae Park  
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of Finance 
 
June 2015 
 
Title: Superstar CEOs and Innovation 
 
 
I empirically evaluate three theoretical views of whether and how winning a high-
profile CEO award affects innovation decisions. The agency theory predicts that 
receiving an award will increase managerial entrenchment and reduce managers’ efforts 
to create valuable innovations because they will either pursue value-decreasing pet 
projects or simply enjoy the quiet life (agency hypothesis). Conversely, the managerial 
myopia theory predicts that these awards may increase managerial job security and allow 
the CEO to focus on long-term innovative projects rather than on boosting the stock price 
through current earnings. Finally, the overconfidence theory predicts that these awards 
increase managerial incentives to innovate if they make CEOs overconfident. In my first 
set of tests, I find evidence that is consistent with the managerial myopia and 
overconfidence theories: award-winning CEOs innovate more than otherwise similar 
CEOs who do not win awards, both in terms of the number of patents and the number of 
citations per patent during the period 1992–2002. After further examination, the evidence 
continues to be consistent with the managerial myopia theory: there is a clear increase in 
CEO power and job security after winning a prestigious award and no such increase in 
overconfidence. I also document that the positive effect of CEO awards on innovation is 
weaker for firms with high institutional ownership. Overall, the evidence suggests that 
v 
winning a prestigious award relieves managerial myopia and brings positive long-term 
benefits for the firm. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Fast-growing compensations and perks given to celebrity CEOs are subject of 
debate among practitioners and academics. The value consequences of a CEO’s superstar 
status is ambiguous because it is unclear whether larger compensations and greater perks 
are designed by shareholders as incentive schemes for CEOs or are extracted by powerful 
CEOs due to their heightened status in the public media. Malmendier and Tate (2009) 
show that superstar CEOs tend to extract rents from shareholders using their heightened 
status and power and are often distracted from their core operational responsibilities, 
which leads to underperformance relative to their peers. In this paper I investigate 
whether there might be a bright side to superstar CEOs that has not been uncovered in the 
extant literature. Specifically, rather than focusing on short-term accounting and stock 
performance, I examine whether superstar CEOs achieve greater long-term success than 
their benchmarks. I use prestigious awards conferred by major national magazines in the 
U.S. to identify a shock in which CEOs achieve superstar status. I use innovative output 
as a measure of the long-term performance.1 
Achieving superstar CEO status by receiving a high-profile CEO award can affect 
CEOs’ long-term incentives via greater power (and in turn, greater job security) as a 
result of winning the award. Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) argue that the effectiveness 
of monitoring a CEO depends on her perceived ability relative to a replacement. Winning 
                                                 
       1 Innovation is considered one of the most important determinants of long-term economic growth and 
value creation for a firm (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2005). The innovation literature also suggests that 
innovation is a strong indicator of a firm’s long-term performance (Cohen, Diether, and Malloy, 2013; 
Hirshleifer, Hsu, and Li, 2013).  
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such an award conveys additional information to the boards that their CEO is of 
exceptionally good quality, resulting in less effective monitoring of the CEO. In addition, 
if a CEO wins a prestigious award, the perception by the shareholders of the CEO’s 
quality (justified or not) improves. If the board fires such a superstar CEO, it may suffer a 
backlash from shareholders since boards are often susceptible to the voice of shareholders 
(Fisman, Khurana, and Rhodes-Kropf, 2013) or the public opinion, more generally.  
Given the argument that award-winning CEOs achieve greater power and job 
security, two strands of research make contradictory predictions about the effect of 
winning a prestigious award on innovation. The agency theory presented by Jensen 
(1988) argues that more powerful managers are also more entrenched. They will waste 
corporate resources in pursuing value-destroying pet projects or will just enjoy the quiet 
life (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003). Managers will spend less time, effort, and 
resources for technologically innovative projects that maximize shareholder wealth and 
help the firm thrive in the long-run. They will also be slow in responding to technological 
changes, and as a result the firm will lag behind its competitors. Therefore, the agency 
hypothesis predicts that winning an award will lead to less innovation.  
On the other hand, Stein (1988, 1989) suggests that, due to asymmetric 
information, the stock market may undervalue the stocks of firms that invest in long-term 
innovative projects. Consequently, to protect current shareholders and themselves from 
dismissal due to perceived poor performance, managers are more likely to focus on 
boosting current earnings at the expense of novel projects. Under this managerial myopia 
view, managers tend to invest in long-term and innovative projects if they have more 
power and face a lower threat of job dismissal. Manso (2011) analytically demonstrates 
3 
that greater job security may allow managers greater leeway to experiment with new 
technologies and, as a result, to pursue more novel projects. Therefore, based on the 
managerial myopia hypothesis, receiving a high-profile award can spur innovation. 
It is important to note that winning a high-profile award may not only affect CEO 
power but may change aspects of the CEO’s psychology after the award. Receiving a 
high-profile award, conferred by reliable outside authorities such as Business Week, 
Forbes, etc., can affect CEOs’ beliefs in their own abilities and future outcomes, causing 
them to become overconfident. Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh (2012) find that overconfident 
managers achieve greater success in patenting activities. Based on the overconfidence 
hypothesis, therefore, I expect that award-winning CEOs innovate more.  
I use data on prestigious CEO awards as an external shock to the CEO status in 
the firm, and examine the effect of winning such a prestigious award on innovation. I 
argue that winning an award shifts a CEO’s status permanently (for the rest of his tenure). 
Since the counterfactual is not observable (i.e., the innovation outputs if the same CEO at 
the same firm had not won an award), and award-winners and non-winners are different 
across many dimensions, I perform a propensity score matching as a main identification 
strategy.2 Using the number of patents and the number of citations per patent as a 
measure of the quantity and quality of innovation output, I find that CEOs who win high-
profile awards during the period 1992-2002 are more innovative after the awards than 
similar CEOs who do not win awards (predicted winners). Specifically, in the four-year 
period following the award, the average actual winner produces 28.13% more patents 
                                                 
      2 A propensity score matching, unlike a conventional regression model, matches award-winning CEOs 
with otherwise similar CEOs who do not receive an award. The matching procedure is performed based on 
observable firm/CEO characteristics including their past innovation levels. Furthermore it helps track 
changes in CEO behavior after winning an award. 
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than the average predicted winner. Furthermore, the number of citations per patent for the 
average actual award-winner is 25.97% greater than the average predicted winner. 
I perform several robustness tests of my inference that superstar CEOs become 
better innovators. First, I test whether winning a prestigious award has an impact on 
innovation if I assume that the effect of winning an award is temporary (just for the year 
of the award) rather than permanent.3 Second, I investigate whether the positive award 
effects exist outside of the sample period (the period prior to 1992) to check if the effects 
are driven by period-specific factors that are correlated with winning an award and 
innovation decisions in the firm. Third, instead of relying on a propensity score matching, 
I implement a Heckman selection model, which mitigates the endogeneity problem that 
arises from a potential omitted-variable bias. In all robustness tests, I find similar results - 
the award has positive effects on innovation.  
The positive relationship between winning a prestigious award and a firm’s 
innovation is subject to potential endogeneity problems. First, CEO unobservable skills 
might drive the positive effect of winning an award on innovation. To address this 
concern, I control for CEO past performance in the matching procedure to capture much 
of their unobservable skill. To eliminate potential omitted variable bias arising from any 
unobservable firm characteristics, I employ firm fixed effects, in the Heckman selection 
model. Second, rather than winning an award positively affecting CEOs’ innovation 
decisions, it is possible that more innovative CEOs are more likely to receive a 
prestigious award and continue to achieve greater success in innovation. I alleviate this 
problem by controlling for CEOs’ innovation achievements prior to the award.  
                                                 
      3 The finding remains robust regardless of whether I use only the first lifetime awards of the award-
winners or all lifetime awards to the same CEO. 
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In further tests I evaluate the managerial myopia vs. the overconfidence theories. 
Specifically, I examine the possible mechanisms through which winning an award affects 
innovation. Consistent with the managerial power hypothesis, I show that there is a clear 
increase in CEO power and job security after winning a prestigious award. First, I 
determine that award-winning CEOs’ level of compensation increases significantly more 
than the benchmark CEOs’ compensation after the award during the period 1992-2011.4 
In addition, I find similar results for CEO excess compensation, which I estimate here 
using Core, Guay, and Larcker’s (2008) method. This evidence suggests that award-
winning CEOs tend to extract rent using their enhanced power in the firm.  
The results also show that award-winners have lower turnover-performance 
sensitivity than non-winners in the two years following the award. In other words, 
winning a prestigious award shifts power towards the CEOs and they are less likely to be 
fired by the board than otherwise similar CEOs, even when they underperform. These 
two findings provide clear evidence that award-winning CEOs become more powerful 
and achieve a greater job security. 
I fail to find evidence consistent with the overconfidence hypothesis. Using an 
option-based measure of overconfidence (Campbell et al., 2011; Hirshleifer et al., 2012), 
I fail to find evidence that winning an award has a significant effect on CEO 
overconfidence. This finding indicates that overconfidence might not be the main source 
of the positive effect of winning a prestigious award on innovation. I also show that the 
award effect on innovation remains statistically and economically significant even after 
                                                 
        4 This finding is consistent with Malmendier and Tate (2009) who conduct their analysis over the 
period 1992-2002. 
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controlling for managerial overconfidence. The evidence suggests that the shift in power 
towards award-winning CEOs and the resulting managerial entrenchment and job 
security is a key determinant of the positive relationship between receiving a prestigious 
award and innovation.   
The magnitude of the award-winning effects on innovation may be heterogeneous 
across firms. I further explore whether the positive effect of award-winning on innovation 
is stronger or weaker for firms that have higher institutional ownership. Edmans (2009) 
and Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales (2013) document that institutional investors 
encourage managers to make decisions to maximize the long-term value of the firm 
rather than its short-term value. Manso (2011) contends that high institutional ownership 
is characterized with greater CEO job security and greater focus on long-term goals. This 
in turn encourages managers to innovate. I find that the positive award-winning effect on 
innovation is weaker for firms with high institutional ownership than for firms with low 
ownership. This result suggests that award winning and institutional ownership are 
substitutes – once the CEO is provided with long-term incentives by high institutional 
ownership, the additional impact of award-winning will be smaller than for firms with 
low institutional ownership. 
 This paper contributes to the extant literature in several ways. First, the recent 
innovation literature has explored how managerial entrenchment (CEO power) affects 
corporate innovation. One segment of these studies finds support for the agency view 
(e.g., Atanassov, 2013), while the other for the managerial myopia view (Becker-Blease, 
7 
2011; Acharya, Baghai, and Subramanian, 2012).5 The evidence in this paper is 
consistent with the managerial myopia view in that managers who become more powerful 
after winning a high-profile award innovate more.  
Furthermore, the previous literature shows that powerful CEOs, on average, 
expropriate shareholders and make value-decreasing decisions such as implementing 
inefficient pet projects (Jensen, 1988), overpaying the target firm in the takeover market 
(Masulis, Wang, and Xie, 2007), engaging in a quiet-life (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 
2003), designing their own suboptimal compensation schemes (Yermack, 1997; Bebchuk 
and Fried 2003), or underperforming in a short-run (Malmendier and Tate, 2009). 
However, most of the existing literature frequently uses protection from hostile takeovers 
as a proxy for managerial entrenchment, despite the fact that hostile takeovers have 
largely disappeared over the past two decades. Using a prestigious award, rather than the 
threat from hostile takeovers, helps researchers identify a more recent shock that in turn 
illustrates the extent to which managers achieve job security.  
Moreover, in employing innovation measures, this study complements the 
previous literature by providing evidence for a positive aspect of CEO entrenchment: 
greater job security as a result of winning a high-profile CEO award relieves managerial 
myopia, resulting in more innovation.6 Additionally, the evidence in this paper helps 
                                                 
       5 Sepra, Subramanian, and Subramania (2013) show that the agency view and the managerial myopia 
view are only “locally” correct. They argue that a relation between governance mechanisms and innovation 
is non- monotonic due to the tradeoff decision between expected takeover premiums and expected 
managerial private benefits of control.   
       6 This study differs in several ways from Malmendier and Tate’s (2009) paper, which was the first to 
address the effects of winning a prestigious award. First, they investigate how superstar CEOs perform in 
the three years following the award while I focus on the effects of winning an award on longer term 
measures of performance, namely innovation outputs. The evidence in this paper, therefore, can be 
reconciled with Malmendier and Tate’s finding of underperformance by superstar CEOs in that, after 
winning an award, they achieve greater leeway to maximize the long-term value of the company at the cost 
8 
resolve the current puzzling issue of why many firms have actively chosen to weaken 
shareholders’ power while giving power to their CEOs despite the findings in previous 
literature that managerial power (entrenchment) leads to negative consequences for the 
firm.7   
The structure of the rest of this paper is as follows. In Chapter II, I review 
previous literature related to managerial entrenchment, managerial overconfidence, and 
corporate innovation, and develop empirical predictions on the effects of winning a 
prestigious award on innovation. Chapter III describes the data and variable 
constructions. I report the empirical results and robustness tests in Chapter IV. 
Conclusions are presented in Chapter V.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
of short-term profits. Secondly, Malmendier and Tate see winning a prestigious award as a shock that shifts 
CEO power temporarily, whereas I consider both possibilities; the power shift as a result of winning a high-
profile award can be either permanent or temporary. Lastly, in my robustness check, I use a sample period 
that extends back to 1976 and test whether the effects of winning an award is time-specific, expanding 
Malmendier and Tate’s sample period by 16 years.  
       7 Facebook, Google, and LinkedIn went public with dual class shares to allow their CEOs to maintain 
their decision-making power. For example, as of 2014, Mark Zuckerberg controls Facebook personally 
despite the fact that he owns only about 20 percent of the company due to supervoting “class B” shares. 
Google issued “class B” and “class C” shares to give a majority of votes to Larry Page and Sergey Brin. In 
this way, those CEOs can retain their control over their firms without allowing any potential conflicts with 
other shareholders over the firms’ directions.   
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CHAPTER II 
THEORETICAL MOTIVATION 
 In this study I investigate whether winning a prestigious business award affects a 
CEO’s innovation decision. In this chapter, I review previous literature and develop 
empirical predictions about the relationship between prestigious CEO awards and 
innovation in this chapter. 
2.1. Theoretical Background and Empirical Prediction 
2.1.1. Shift in CEO Power (Entrenchment) 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) maintain that the effectiveness of monitoring a 
CEO depends on the CEO’s bargaining power over the board and that this bargaining 
power comes from the board’s assessment of the CEO’s ability. Winning a prestigious 
award may convey the additional information that the quality of the CEO is exceptional 
among potential CEOs in the managerial labor market. Thus, an enhanced perception of 
the CEO’s ability as a result of winning an award leads to less effective monitoring by the 
board.8 Malmendier and Tate (2009) support this argument by providing evidence that by 
using their increased power, award-winning CEOs tend to extract more rent than non-
winners after winning an award, even though they underperform the benchmarks in the 
three years subsequent to the award. Moreover, the boards allow award-winning CEOs to 
                                                 
        8 One might argue that the effect of winning a prestigious award on the perceived ability of a CEO is 
negligible because a prestigious award is given based on publicly available information that boards and 
shareholders also have. However, Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) argue that the effectiveness of 
monitoring CEOs depends on CEOs’ “relative ability” in comparison to other potential successors and that 
it is costly for the board to search and evaluate the quality of all potential CEOs outside the firm before 
their CEO receives the award. Therefore, winning an award delivers the information that the CEO is of 
exceptionally good quality compared to other CEOs (potential successors), resulting in a positive shift in 
the CEO’s bargaining power over the board. 
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do non-operational, outside-company activities such as writing books, sitting on more 
outside boards, and playing more golf. They argue that the increase in compensation and 
outside activities, despite the underperformance of superstar CEOs, indicate that there is a 
clear shift in CEO power after winning an award. 
Award-winning CEOs are also likely to achieve greater job security after their 
awards. Fisman, Khurana, and Rhodes-Kropf (2013) argue that if boards are susceptible 
to biased shareholders’ voice (i.e., boards are not insulated from the shareholders), the 
board cannot often make CEO firing or retaining decisions in a way that maximizes the 
long-term value of the firm. If a board fires an award-winning CEO, the board may then 
suffer from shareholder backlash because shareholder assessment of their CEO’s quality 
improves (justified or not) and the shareholders see their CEO as the public face of the 
firm after the award.  
There have been several theoretical and empirical studies about the relationship 
between CEO entrenchment and innovation. Jensen’s (1988) agency view contends that 
managers have fewer incentives to maximize shareholder value in the absence of a threat 
of disciplinary takeovers. Powerful CEOs who are not well-monitored or who are not 
pressured by internal (e.g., a board of directors) and external (e.g., hostile takeovers) 
governance mechanisms are more likely to exhibit self-dealing behaviors and to engage 
in value-destroying activities. Thus, the agency view predicts that the threat of dismissal 
mitigates the agency problem by forcing the CEO to invest in the most innovative and 
valuable projects. Another version of the agency view is the “quiet life” story. Bertrand 
and Mullainathan (2003) find that managers protected by state anti-takeover laws are 
more likely to avoid difficult and risky investments (such as innovative and valuable 
11 
projects), and entrenched managers might prefer a quiet life over empire-building. The 
agency view expects that a power shift towards a CEO leads to either self-dealing 
behaviors or quiet-life behaviors and that CEOs do not exert themselves on innovative 
projects since such projects require investment in human capital.  
In support of the agency view, Atanassov (2013) examines whether changes in the 
quality of corporate governance due to shifts in the threat of a hostile takeover (as an 
exogenous shock to the quality of governance) affect corporate innovation. He concludes 
that firms incorporated in states that have passed anti-takeover laws innovate less than 
those incorporated in states that have not passed such laws. Atanassov’s study shows that 
managers who have greater job security because of the passage of these anti-takeover 
laws are reluctant to invest their human capital in innovative projects, resulting in lower 
innovation outputs and lower firm values. Based on the agency view, I predict that CEOs 
who win high-profile awards will innovate less.   
Hypothesis 1a: Based on the agency hypothesis, superstar CEOs will innovate 
less than benchmark CEOs. 
Conversely, the managerial myopia theory makes a different prediction on the 
effect of award-winning on innovation. It suggests that CEOs who face a threat of 
dismissal have fewer incentives to invest their effort and human capital in innovative 
projects. Innovative projects can take several years to be realized as profits, and if an 
incumbent manager is dismissed as a result of a hostile takeover, a new manager could 
take most of the profits from the innovative products that the previous manager began 
(Shleifer and Summers, 1988). Stein (1988) and Shleifer and Vishny (1989) also argue 
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that, because of the threat of dismissal through a hostile takeover, managers are often not 
willing to invest in long-term innovative projects because the market undervalues those 
innovative projects and managers may be replaced due to poor stock market performance. 
Acharya et al. (2012b) show that a decreased threat of dismissal through stringent labor 
laws leads to more innovation by employees. Manso (2011) contends that innovation 
typically has a high chance of failure and therefore managers who have an increased 
threat of job termination are unlikely to choose innovative projects; early failure of such 
risky innovative projects may cause a board to fire a poor performing CEO. He 
demonstrates that, under his theoretical framework, managers innovate more if their jobs 
are secure. Overall, the managerial short-termism view predicts that job security fosters 
corporate innovation because it encourages managers to invest in long-term, risky, and 
innovative projects. Therefore, based on the managerial myopia theory, I expect that 
CEOs who win a prestigious award will innovate more since such a high-profile award 
enhances the status of CEOs inside the firm and creates job security for them. 
Hypothesis 1b: Based on the managerial myopia hypothesis, superstar CEOs will 
innovate more than benchmark CEOs. 
2.1.2. Shift in CEO Overconfidence 
Winning a prestigious award can change not only the managerial investment 
decision horizon corresponding to a shift in managerial power, but also aspects of the 
psychology of a manager after the award. Thus, it is possible that a change in the 
psychological traits of the manager as a result of winning a prestigious award also affects 
a firm’s innovation decisions. The most relevant psychological trait (among many 
13 
psychological biases) to winning an award might be overconfidence. Overconfidence is 
the tendency of individuals to think that they have better abilities than they really have, 
causing them to be more optimistic about their future success without rational reasons. 
Recent corporate finance literature has investigated how managerial overconfidence 
affects a firm’s decisions such as those pertaining to investment (Malmendier and Tate, 
2005a), mergers and acquisitions (Malmendier and Tate, 2008), and financing policies 
(Malmendier and Tate, 2011). In particular, Hirshleifer et al. (2012) indicate that firms 
with overconfident CEOs (proxied by options- and press-based measures) invest more in 
innovation, obtain more patents and patent citations, and achieve greater innovative 
success for given R&D expenditures. Their study provides interesting findings with 
regard to high-profile CEO awards. For example, CEOs might become overconfident 
after they win such prestigious awards; they are likely to overestimate their skills and to 
have a self-attribution bias. Based on this managerial overconfidence view, I predict that 
CEOs will innovate more after they win an award. 
 Hypothesis 2a: Based on the overconfidence hypothesis, superstar CEOs will 
innovate more than benchmark CEOs. 
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CHAPTER III 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Data 
I hand-collect a list of the winners of CEO awards conferred by prominent 
national magazines between 1976 and 2011. Following Malmendier and Tate (2009), I 
select CEO awards that meet the following conditions: (1) the magazines that grant the 
awards are popular and circulated nationally; (2) all CEOs are eligible for an award. As a 
result, only awards that are conferred by the following magazines are included in my 
sample: Business Week, Financial World, Chief Executive, Electronic Business 
Magazine, Ernst & Young, Forbes, Industry Week, Marketwatch.com, Morningstar.com, 
Time, and Time/CNN. Among the listed magazines, Business Week and Financial World 
provide the majority of the award-winners in this sample.9  
The CEO award data is then matched with CEO and firm characteristics variables. 
I obtain CEO demographic and compensation information from the Execucomp database. 
I attain CEO incentive measures (delta and vega) from Lalitha Naveen’s website.10 I 
collect CEO turnover data from Kuhnen’s website.11  As the Execucomp database only 
provides executive data from 1992, my sample includes only CEO awards winners since 
1992.12 All firm information and characteristics are extracted from Compustat. I exclude 
non-US firms from the sample because non-US firms are different from US firms across 
                                                 
       9 Malmendier and Tate (2009) provide details about these awards. 
       10 http://astro.temple.edu/~lnaveen/. I would also like to thank Steve McKeon for sharing CEO delta 
and vega measures to fill in missing values in Naveen’s data. 
       11 http://public.kenan-flagler.unc.edu/faculty/kuhnenc/RESEARCH/research.html.  
       12 In the robustness check section, I include awards granted prior to 1992 in the sample to check 
whether award-winning effects on innovation vary over time. In Chapter IV, more recent award-winners 
after 2002 are included in the sample to examine what sources drive the award effect on innovation.  
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many dimensions such as ownership structure, governance scheme, legal protections to 
shareholders, business laws, and corporate culture. In addition, CEOs of non-US firms 
might not have the same chance of winning awards as those of US firms. I obtain stock 
return data for the sample firms from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). 
I calculate risk-adjusted returns by using Carhart’s four factor model. The Fama-French 
return factors (Rm-Rf, SMB, and HML) and momentum factors (UMD) for each year are 
collected from Ken French’s online website.13 Finally, I merge the sample with the patent 
data.  The patent data is obtained from the National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER) patent database (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2001). It provides the number of 
patents and citations for each firm at year t and the mean number of patents and citations 
at year t across firms and industries. As the patent data is only available up to 2006 and I 
focus on changes in innovation activity in the four years following a prestigious CEO 
award, my final sample period is restricted to the years between 1992 and 2002. After I 
match the CEO award data with Execucomp, Compustat, CRSP, and patent data, a total 
of 263 awards (163 unique award-winners) are identified.  
3.2. Variable Construction for Propensity Score Matching14 
3.2.1. Treatment Variable: Award Dummy  
Winning a prestigious award attracts public attention and award-winning CEOs 
appear more frequently in the media, thereby becoming a public face of their corporation 
and a nationwide “superstar.” The CEOs, then, use this increased status to maintain their 
superstar standing throughout their tenure. In other words, winning a high-profile award 
                                                 
       13 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
       14 More details about the propensity score matching method are described in Appendix B. 
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is likely to shift an award-winner’s status in the firm permanently (until he/she leaves or 
retires from the company), regardless of whether he/she receives later awards or not. 
Therefore, as a treatment dummy, I use an award indicator variable equal to one for all 
the years after the award and zero before the award for all award-winners. An indicator 
variable equal to zero is used for all years for all non-winners.  
3.2.2. Outcome Variables 
The outcome variable of interest in the propensity score matching is a firm’s 
innovation outputs. Innovation is considered the key to the long-term success of a firm. In 
addition, measures of the firm’s performance in previous literature might not correctly 
reflect a firm’s intrinsic value. For example, Stein (1988) argues that, due to information 
asymmetry, investors tend to undervalue stocks of firms that invest in long-term 
innovative projects. Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2013) establish that the stock market 
tends to misvalue the impounded information about innovation and, as a result, current 
stock prices do not correctly reflect the intrinsic value of stocks. Hirshleifer, Hsu, and Li 
(2013) assert that information regarding innovation is hard for investors to process due to 
its intangibility and high uncertainty and therefore the stock market may misprice the 
fundamental value of the firms. Their finding suggests that innovation efficiency 
(measured by patents or citations per dollar of research and development) provides 
information to predict a firm’s future return. Therefore, innovation better reflects a firm’s 
fundamental value than the conventional measures of a firm’s performance such as stock 
return performance.  
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As a quantity measure of innovation, I use the number of patents for each firm at 
year t. The NBER patent database includes patents only if they are successfully granted. 
In addition, on average, it takes 2 years for applied patents to be granted. Thus, the most 
recent applied patents (in 2004 and 2005) may not be included in the database. To control 
for this truncation bias, I divide the number of patents for each firm-year by the mean 
number of patents for the same year.  
However, the number of patents does not necessarily represent the technological 
and economic importance of these patents. Patents that are more frequently cited tend to 
be more valuable economically and technologically. Therefore, I also use the number of 
citations per patent as a measure of the quality of innovation. Nonetheless, the number of 
citations per patent may also suffer from a truncation bias. Patents granted in more recent 
years have fewer chances of being cited than those that were granted in earlier years. To 
control for this truncation bias, I scale the citation measure by the average number of 
citations per patent of all patents in the same year. I winsorize the two innovation output 
variables at the 95th percentile.15 
3.2.3. Matching Variables 
A propensity score matching selects predicted winners based on the propensity 
scores estimated in the logistic regression. As a dependent variable, I use an award 
dummy variable equal to one if CEOs win their awards at year t and equal to zero 
                                                 
      15 Previous literature uses a firm’s R&D expenditure to measure that firm’s innovation. However, 
recent innovation studies (e.g., Hirshleifer et al., 2012; Atanassov, 2013, among others) differentiate an 
input of innovation from an output of innovation since R&D expenditure may not be used efficiently within 
firms. In addition, reported R&D expenditure may be at the discretion of the reporting firms and may 
furthermore be subject to accounting rules.  
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otherwise. A criteria of selection for matching variables is that they might affect either 
the likelihood of winning an award, the innovation outcome, or both. The intuition behind 
the criteria of matching variables is that treatment groups and matched groups must be 
similar in terms of the propensity to win an award and of future innovation incentives. 
Following Malmendier and Tate (2009), I use 1-year Carhart’s four-factor risk-adjusted 
stock returns prior to the award, CEO age, and CEO tenure as matching variables to 
estimate propensity scores in order to predict award-winners. Matching variables to 
estimate propensity scores for innovation incentives reported in the innovation literature 
are sales, R&D, cash, leverage, profitability, tangibility, firm age, and CEO incentives 
(delta and vega).16 All matching variables are measured at the end of the last fiscal year 
prior to the award grant month.  
Most of the CEO awards in the sample are conferred either at the end of the year 
or at the beginning of the next year. Thus, I set time t as the month of the award, year t-1 
denotes the calendar year prior to the award, and year t+1 denotes the calendar year after 
the award. For example, Business Week awarded Steve Jobs one of the “Best Managers of 
1998” in January 11, 1999. Therefore, year t-1 denotes year 1998 and year t+1 represents 
year 1999. 
To eliminate any large influence of outliers on the results, I winsorize all 
continuous variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles. To control for any unobservable time-
invariant characteristics of each industry and any macroeconomic shock, I include 
industry dummies (at the two-digit SIC level) and year dummies in the first stage 
                                                 
       16 More details about variables are described in Appendix A. 
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regression. The standard errors are clustered at the CEO/firm level. Therefore, the 
specification of the logit regression is as follows.   
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
4.1. Summary Statistics  
If treatment groups are randomly assigned, treatment and control groups are, on 
average, similar across all firm/CEO characteristics. If this is the case, one can estimate 
the average treatment effect for treated groups simply by comparing the outcomes 
between treatment groups and control groups. However, Table 1 (please see APPENDIX 
C for all tables) shows that this is not the case. Both treatment groups (first-time award-
winners and all award-winners) are heterogeneous with non-winners (the non-treatment 
group) across many dimensions of firm and CEO characteristics. Based on sales, total 
assets, and market capitalization, award-winners manage significantly larger firms than 
non-winners’ firms. With respect to past stock market performance (1yr-, 2yr-, and 3yr-
stock returns prior to an award) and accounting performance, as expected, award-
winners’ firms are better performers than non-winners’ firms. Award-winners’ firms have 
a higher Tobin’s Q and their firms belong to more competitive industries than non-
winners. Award-winners are compensated more than non-winners and they have a higher 
pay for performance (delta) and higher risk-taking incentives (vega). These 
heterogeneous characteristics between the treatment group and the non-treatment group 
make it difficult to estimate the average treatment effect by directly comparing the 
outcomes between treated and non-treated groups.   
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4.2. First Stage Regression Result 
Table 2 shows the results of the first-stage propensity score matching procedure 
(using a logit regression) to estimate propensity scores, based on the sample of 3,092 
groups (CEO-firm) and 12,435 CEO-firm-year observations. The dependent variable is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the CEO wins an award at year t, while explanatory 
variables are those used as matching variables in the framework of the propensity score 
matching procedure. The coefficients are presented as odds ratios and standard errors are 
clustered by firm/CEO groups to control for potential cross-sectional dependence in 
residuals. I use industry dummies at the two-digit SIC level to control for unobservable 
heterogeneity across industries, and include year dummies to control for any 
macroeconomic shocks.17 The logit regression results are consistent with findings from 
the summary statistics in Table 1. CEOs who manage larger (in terms of sales), better 
performing (in terms of stock returns), and cash sufficient firms are more likely to receive 
awards. In addition, CEOs whose compensation is more tied to performance and CEOs 
with a shorter tenure are more likely to win awards. Based on the coefficient estimates, I 
calculate a propensity score for each group at year t to find matched control groups for 
each treatment group.18  
 
 
                                                 
       17 As a robustness check, I also use Fama-French 48 industries or Fama-French 12 industries dummies 
instead of two-digit SIC level dummies. The magnitudes and significance of the coefficients for either case 
are very similar.  
        18 Instead of logit regression, I use a probit regression to estimate the propensity score. The 
coefficients of matching variables in magnitude and significance and the corresponding propensity scores 
remain similar. This finding is consistent with recent propensity score matching literature that suggests that 
a choice between a logit and probit regression is not problematic if a treatment indicator variable is binary.  
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4.3. Second Stage Result: The Effect of Winning an Award on Innovation  
 The goal of this study is to measure the impact of prestigious CEO awards on a 
firm’s innovation. Since winning a high-profile CEO award might affect that firm’s 
innovation with a time lag, I focus on a firm’s innovation for up to 4 years after the CEO 
wins an award. To improve the quality of the matching procedure, I restrict matched 
groups (predicted winners) by selecting within the same year groups and the same 
industry groups (at the two-digit SIC level). Importantly, one might argue that award-
winning firms are always more innovative than other firms regardless of whether they 
receive prestigious awards or not, resulting in inaccurate estimates of the award-winning 
effect. To mitigate the potential reverse causality problem, I partition the sample firms 
into two groups based on the level of patenting activities at year t-1 and match actual 
award winners and predicted winners within each group. As a result, predicted winners 
are selected within the same year, industry, and similar current innovation groups as 
actual winners. The predicted winners are chosen by a single nearest neighbor, 10-nearest 
neighbors, and a kernel (Gaussian) matching algorithm.19 20 
Figure 1 (please see APPENDIX C for all figures) illustrates the mean number of 
patents for actual award winners, predicted winners, and non-winners over the four-year 
period following the awards. Although the numbers of patents for actual winners and 
predicted winners are similar before the awards (at year t-1), the data show that the actual 
                                                 
         19 Further details about each matching algorithms are discussed in the Appendix B.  
         20 Moreover, in order to reduce bias between actual winners and predicted winners, I set a common 
support region (Smith and Todd, 2005). In the common support region setting, I exclude treatment groups 
whose propensity score is higher than the maximum propensity score of the control groups, as well as 
control groups whose propensity score is lower than the minimum propensity score of the treatment groups. 
Standard errors are corrected by bootstrapping to improve the accuracy of standard errors.   
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winners’ number of patents increases more than both predicted - and non-winners’ over 
the four years following the awards.   
Table 3 presents the results of the impact of CEO awards on innovation using a 
propensity score matching. For the number of patents (a measure of the quantity of 
innovation), the matching estimates (the number of patents by actual winners minus those 
by predicted winners) are significant year t+1 to t+4 across all three matching 
procedures. In other words, actual winners consistently and significantly produce more 
patents than predicted winners from year t+1 to year t+4, regardless of which matching 
algorithms are employed to select predicted winners. On average, each year actual award-
winners have 20.71% (year t+1) to 35.45% (year t+2) more patents than predicted 
winners during the four-year period after their awards.  
I find similar results for the number of citations per patent (a measure of the 
quality of innovation). Regardless of which matching algorithms are used (single-, 
multiple nearest neighbor, kernel matching), the mean differences in the scaled number of 
citations per patent between the two groups are significant at the 5% level for year t to 
year t+4. In terms of the magnitude of effects, based on single nearest neighbor matching 
estimates, the actual winners have 18.87% (year t+1)  to 32.23% (year t+4) more 
citations per patent than the predicted winners for year t to year t+4, suggesting that the 
actual winners achieve more economically and technologically important innovations 
than predicted winners.  
Since a CEO’s award affects a firm’s innovation outputs with a lag, one might 
argue that these innovation outputs are accomplished by that CEO’s decisions prior to the 
award. However, the results show that award-winners still achieve more patents and 
24 
citations per patent in later years (year t+3 and t+4) as well as in the first two years after 
the award. In sum, the results suggest that CEOs who win awards become better 
innovators in terms of the number of patents and the number of citations per patent after 
the awards than matched CEOs who do not win awards.  
4.4. Robustness Checks 
In this section, I check whether a positive award-winning effect on long-term 
innovation decisions is robust, regardless of whether there is a different treatment effect 
model assumption, broader sample periods (periods earlier than 1992), or a different 
estimation technique (Heckman selection model).  
4.1.1. Temporary Shift Model 
One might argue that winning a prestigious award affects a CEO's status 
temporarily. In other words, award-winning CEOs enjoy enhanced status after the award 
but they lose their status shortly thereafter. In this case, a different specification for an 
award dummy variable is required. I consider two scenarios: first-time award and 
multiple awards to the same CEO. I set the award indicator variable to one if a CEO wins 
an award at year t and zero otherwise.21 Actual winners are matched with predicted 
winners within the same year, industry, and past innovation groups. 
Table 4 reports the results of the temporary shift model. Panel A presents the 
matching estimates of a first-time award. Similar to the results of the permanent shift 
model in Table 3, actual winners produce more patents than benchmark CEOs from year t 
                                                 
        21 Further, I convert the award dummy variable to a missing value for award winner-year observations 
after the award so that they are not selected as predicted winners in the second stage. 
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to year t+4, no matter which matching methods are used. The mean differences in the 
number of patents between the two groups for year t to year t+4 are significant at the 1% 
significance level. Likewise, based on nearest neighbor matching estimates, the scaled 
number of citations per patent is larger for the actual award-winners than for the 
benchmark CEOs by 19% (nearest neighbor matching estimate at year t+3) to 47% 
(nearest neighbor estimate at year t+4) and the differences between the two groups are 
significant at the 5% significance level except for year t+4. The matching estimates by a 
10-nearest neighbor matching and kernel matching confirm that actual winners have 
more citations per patent than predicted winners and the differences are all significant at 
the 5% level.  
Panel B gives the matching results of all multiple awards to the same CEO in the 
temporary shift framework. The matching estimates for both the quantity and quality 
measure of innovation are all significant at the 5% level regardless of which matching 
algorithms are employed. This confirms that even when a temporary shift in CEO power 
as a result of winning a high-profile award is assumed, winning such a prestigious award 
motivates managers to focus more on long-term investments rather than short-term 
profits, and produces more economically and technically important patents, regardless of 
whether the award is a CEO’s first award or one of many. 
4.2.2. The Effect of Winning an Award over the Broader Sample Period 
 One might argue that the effects of winning a prestigious award on innovation 
decisions are time-specific. Period-specific factors that are correlated with CEO status 
and innovation activities in the firm might be omitted. In this section, I investigate 
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whether the award effects on innovation persist outside the sample period. I explore the 
award effects prior to 1992 as well as over a broader sample period (1976 to 2002). It is 
important to note that CEO delta and vega measures, CEO age, and tenure are omitted in 
the first stage of the propensity score matching procedure because Execucomp only 
provides CEO information from 1992. Even though the exclusion of CEO variables in the 
first stage might affect the propensity score and estimates of a treatment effect, this sub-
sample period analysis provides an opportunity to explore whether or not award effects 
are time-sensitive.   
Table 5 reports matching estimates in the permanent shift framework over the 
period from 1976 to 1991 and over the entire period 1976 to 2002.22 Similar to the 
findings in previous analyses, award-winning effects are highly significant at the 1% 
level over the broader sample period (1976 to 2002) and the effects remain significantly 
persistent even over the early period (periods prior to 1992), regardless of which 
matching algorithm is used. The results in Table 5 suggest that CEOs who win awards 
innovate more compared to similar CEOs, even during the earlier period and that the 
effects, therefore, are not time-specific.23  
4.4.3. Other Robustness Checks 
I also perform other robustness checks. First, I exclude award-winners who leave 
or retire from their company within two years of receiving an award. If a CEO who wins 
a prestigious award knows that he/she will leave the company soon or if he/she wants to 
                                                 
       22 The estimates of the 10-nearest neighbor matching is not reported in the table due to brevity. The 
results are very similar to other matching methods.  
        23 I also implement a propensity score matching in the temporary shift model framework over the 
broader sample periods. The results are very similar to the permanent shift model. 
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move to another company, he/she does not have a strong incentive to pursue long-term 
and innovative projects and could choose to focus on short-term profits. Second, in the 
propensity score matching procedure, I use a variety of nearest neighbors (e.g., 5, 20, and 
50) instead of a 10-multiple nearest neighbor matching. In addition, instead of a Gaussian 
function I also implement a variety of kernel weighting schemes such as biweight, 
Epanechnikov, uniform, tricube kernel functions, and local linear weighting scheme. The 
results for both cases remain very similar in the sense that award-winners innovate more 
than predicted award-winners. 
4.4.4. Heckman Selection Model: Controlling for Endogeneity 
 In the previous section, I perform a propensity score matching to examine the 
effect of winning an award on a CEO’s innovation decisions. As discussed by 
Malmendier and Tate (2009), CEO awards are a good application of propensity score 
matching because those awards are conferred by corporate outsiders who select award-
winners based on public information. Nonetheless, the positive effect of winning an 
award on innovation might be more rigorous if the same result existed in a regression 
framework. The standard linear regression, however, might be problematic in the case of 
CEO awards. It suffers from a potential endogeneity problem that arises from an omitted-
variable bias because the set of public information that the corporate outsiders rely on is 
not observable. Therefore, I perform a Heckman selection model to deal with the 
omitted-variable problem. The model includes two steps:  
                                                             (1) 
where ) 
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                                                 (2) 
where ) 
In selection equation (1), the model estimates the probability of winning an award 
for each CEO/firm group by regressing the award dummy variable (Award) on a set of 
CEO/firm characteristics (  that predict the likelihood of winning an award. I include 1-
year Carhart’s four-factor risk-adjusted stock returns prior to an award, log(market 
capitalization), book-to-market, log(CEO age), and log(1+CEO tenure) as explanatory 
variables in the first equation. In equation (2), the model regresses innovation outcomes 
year t+1 to year t+4 on the estimated probability of winning an award in the selection 
equation along with a set of variables that affect innovation (X). I include log(sales), 
R&D/assets, leverage, tangibility, profitability, cash/assets, log(1+firm age), log(1+CEO 
delta), log(1+CEO vega), log(1+CEO tenure), and log(CEO age) in the set of variables 
that affect innovation. Importantly, to further eliminate a potential omitted variable 
problem, I include lagged patenting outcomes and run a regression in the firm fixed 
effects framework. I believe that including lagged patenting outcomes and employing a 
firm fixed effects approach help control for any remaining firm-level omitted variable 
bias.24 To control for any macroeconomic shocks, year dummies are also included in the 
regression. 
Table 6 provides estimates of the Heckman selection model. When the quantity of 
innovation is a dependent variable in the second stage regression, the award variables are 
all positive during the four years following the award. The award variables are 
                                                 
       24 I also implement industry fixed effects instead of firm fixed effects. Both the economic magnitude 
and statistical significance of the award variable become stronger when industry fixed effects are 
employed. 
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statistically significant at the 5% level for the first three years and the award variable in 
year t+4 is close to the cutoff of significance at 10% level (t=1.58). When the quality of 
innovation is examined, the award variables are all significantly positive at the 10% level 
but the award variable in year t+4 is not significant. The results in Table 6 demonstrate 
that, after dealing with a potential omitted-variable bias, award-winning CEOs, on 
average, produce more and better quality patents. In other words, winning a high-profile 
award encourages CEOs to invest in long-term, risky, and innovative projects and helps 
mitigate any managerial incentives to make myopic investment decisions. The results in 
Table 6 confirm the finding of a positive effect of winning a high-profile award on 
innovation and it holds even in the parametric regression framework.  
4.5. Sources of the Positive Award-winning Effect on Innovation 
  The evidence presented in Chapter III suggests that winning a prestigious award 
helps CEOs focus on long-term growth rather than short-term earnings. In this section, I 
investigate the channel through which winning a prestigious award fuels innovation. 
Based on the managerial myopia hypothesis, greater power given to CEOs after a 
prestigious award incentivizes them to pursue long-term, innovative projects since a shift 
in CEO power helps insulate them from the risk of job dismissal. On the other hand, the 
overconfidence hypothesis predicts that CEOs’ psychological biases as a result of 
receiving an award is the driving force for the positive effect.  
4.5.1. Do Award-Winning CEOs Become More Powerful? 
I explore whether award-winning CEOs become more powerful (and, in turn, 
more entrenched) in two ways: CEO compensation and CEO turnover-performance 
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sensitivity. In these analyses, in addition to the award-winners in the sample from 1992 to 
2002, I include more recent award winners up to 2011 for the CEO compensation 
analysis and up to 2006 for the CEO turnover-performance sensitivity analysis. 
First, I examine whether CEOs extract rents after winning an award during the 
sample period 1992-2011.25 Figure 2 plots CEO total compensation between actual 
award-winners, predicted winners, and non-winners.26 Figure 2 shows that total 
compensation of award-winning CEOs substantially increases by about 40% over the two 
years following an award while predicted winners’ compensation slightly decreases by 
about 8% over the same period.  
I quantify the increases in CEO compensation and report the results in Panel A of 
Table 7. Award-winners not only receive higher compensation than similar CEOs who do 
not win awards, but they also enjoy more increases in compensation after their awards 
than similar CEOs. The differences in compensation increases around the time of the 
awards between award-winners and predicted winners are significant at the 1% level. 
One might argue that award-winners are compensated more because they perform better 
than similar CEOs or that it might be the optimal decision for a firm to pay its CEO more 
as a way of incentivizing him/her to maximize firm value. Thus, it is necessary to 
eliminate potential factors that affect CEO compensation. Core, Guay, and Larcker 
                                                 
       25 Malmendier and Tate’s (2009) analysis for rent extraction is based on award-winners from the period 
1992- 2002 while my analysis covers award-winners up to 2011. 
       26 Predicted winners are chosen by the propensity score matching technique. I use firm size, returns, 
CEO gender, CEO age, and CEO tenure as matching variables that might affect one’s propensity to win a 
prestigious award. I also use reported determinants of CEO compensation by prior executive compensation 
literature as a matching variable: ROA, sales growth, cash, firm risk, and CEO/chairman duality (Core, 
Guay, and Larcker, 2008; Core, Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999; Murphy, 1999; Rose and Shepard, 1997). 
Award winners and predicted winners are matched within the same year and same industry group at the 
two-digit SIC level. To further eliminate heterogeneity for CEO total compensation between actual winners 
and predicted winners at year t-1, I sort the sample CEOs into deciles of total compensation and then I 
force actual award-winners and predicted winners to match within the same decile. 
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(2008) estimate excess compensation using a two-stage method. First, they estimate 
expected compensation by regressing log(compensation) on log(sales), contemporaneous 
and lagged returns and ROA, book-to-market, S&P 500 indicator variable, and 
log(tenure) along with year- and industry-fixed effects. Second, they compute excess 
compensation by adjusting estimated expected compensation. The results for Panel A 
also suggest that award-winners receive significantly more increased compensation than 
benchmark CEOs during the period between year t-1 and year t+2.  
The evidence of an immediate jump in compensation over the first two years 
following the award suggests that superstar CEOs extract a higher compensation using 
their increased power as a result of winning an award, both relative to their own 
compensation before winning an award and relative to that of predicted winners. In 
contrast to total compensation, however, in Figure 1, there is no significant difference in 
cash compensation between award-winners and similar CEOs in the regression (not 
tabulated). Evidence of a heterogeneous pattern for compensation is consistent with 
Malmendier and Tate’s finding. They suggest that award-winning CEOs extract rents 
mostly from equity compensation to avoid potential shareholder outrage because equity 
compensations are less transparent to shareholders and it is not easy for shareholders to 
monitor compensation due to a lack of information.  
Award-winning CEOs are also likely to have lower CEO performance-turnover 
sensitivity after winning an award because they become more visible to the public and, as 
a result, the boards are more likely to be susceptible to shareholder voice (Fisman et al., 
2013). I use CEO turnover data from the period 1992-2006 from Camelia Kuhnen’s 
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website.27 I implement a multinomial logistic regression to examine whether winning an 
award affects CEO turnover.28 The dependent variable is CEO turnover which is equal to 
one for exogenous turnover (e.g., scheduled retirement, death, etc.), equal to two for 
unclassified turnover, equal to three for forced turnover, and equal to zero for no turnover 
events. Thus, the reference category in the regression is no turnover events. Since I am 
interested in the question of whether award-winning CEOs are fired when they 
underperform less frequently than similar CEOs who do not win awards, I include a poor 
performance dummy, which is equal to one if a firm is in the bottom 25% of the sample 
firms based on ROA in a given year and zero otherwise. The interest variable in the 
regression is an interaction term between the award dummy and the poor performance 
dummy. All other variables in Panel B of Table 7 are described in Appendix A. 
I find evidence that award-winning CEOs are less likely to be fired by boards (and 
are even less likely to leave the firm for unclassified reasons) relative to non-winning 
CEOs, even though they underperform. The interaction term between the award dummy 
and the poor-performance dummy is significantly negative at the 1% level for forced 
turnover during the first two years following the award. In terms of the economic 
magnitude of the effect of winning an award on CEO turnover, award-winning CEOs are 
10 times less likely to be fired than similar CEOs when they underperform. The evidence 
                                                 
        27 I would like to thank Camelia Kuhnen for making the CEO turnover data publicly available. 
        28 I implement a multinomial logit regression, rather than a propensity score matching for two reasons. 
First, CEO turnover is a very rare event. In my sample, only two award-winning CEOs were fired by 
boards in the year of their award. Therefore, a small change in the number of forced turnover events in the 
predicted winner group will substantially swing the estimates of the difference in forced turnover rate 
between award-winners and predicted winners. Second, due to the small number of award-winners, I 
cannot perform a CEO turnover-performance sensitivity analysis. There are very few awards winners in the 
poor performance category. 
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in Panel B demonstrates that boards are reluctant to fire award-winning CEOs even 
though they underperform. 
In sum, the evidence in Table 7 suggests that there is a clear shift in CEO power 
in the firm after a CEO wins a prestigious award and that the CEO tends to extract rent 
(consistent with Malmendier and Tate, 2009) and to enjoy greater job security. In other 
words, CEOs become more powerful and face a lower threat of dismissal after receiving 
an award, and this job security might drive CEOs to pursue long-term growth 
opportunities rather than short-term profits. Therefore, the evidence from Table 7 is 
consistent with the managerial myopia hypothesis.  
4.5.2. Do Award-Winning CEOs Become Overconfident? 
 It is possible that winning a high-profile award not only shifts power towards 
CEOs but may also change aspects of their psychology. Recent corporate finance 
literature has focused on the effect of managerial overconfidence on firm decisions and 
its corresponding consequences. Overconfidence is the tendency of individuals to 
overestimate their abilities and forecast future outcomes unreasonably optimistically. 
CEO awards are conferred by corporate outsiders such as prominent nation-wide 
magazines which are considered more reliable institutions than individuals. Thus, 
winning such a prestigious award might bias CEOs’ beliefs about their skills and abilities 
and affect the extent to which they are optimistic about their future outcomes on 
investments.  
Related to CEO overconfidence and innovation, Hirshleifer et al. (2012) show 
that firms with overconfident CEOs (proxied by options- and press-based measures) 
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invest more in innovation, obtain more patents and patent citations, and achieve greater 
innovative success for given R&D expenditures. As winning an award can make CEOs 
overconfident and because managerial overconfidence is positively associated with 
patenting activities, one might argue that being overconfident after winning an award 
drives the positive effects of the award on innovation. Therefore, it is important to 
determine how winning a prestigious award changes CEO overconfidence and how this 
change in biased beliefs in turn affects innovation decisions. 
I estimate a CEO overconfidence measure based on managerial options following 
the previous literature (Campbell, Gallmeyer, Johnson, Rutherford, and Stanley, 2011; 
Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh, 2012). The overconfidence variable is an indicator variable 
which is equal to one if a CEO does not exercise stock options that are more than 67% in 
the money and zero otherwise. I first examine whether receiving a prestigious award 
affects a CEO’s overconfidence. Among the award-winners in the sample between 1992 
and 2011 (218 unique award-winners with a non-missing overconfidence variable), only 
about 3% of winners (6 winners) become overconfident during their tenures after the 
awards.29 Winning a prestigious award does not change an overconfidence trait for the 
majority of the award-winners in the sample. To quantify the effect of winning an award 
on overconfidence, I run a regression in which the dependent variable is an indicator 
variable of whether a CEO becomes overconfident within the next four years in a given 
year t. For award-winners, the dependent variable is one if a CEO becomes overconfident 
within the four years following the award. A key independent variable is the award 
                                                 
       29 160 award-winners (73.4% of the winners in the sample) are already overconfident before winning 
an award while 52 award-winners (23.9% of the winners) remain less confident regardless of winning an 
award.  
35 
dummy which is equal to one if a CEO receives an award at year t and zero otherwise. I 
also employ several control variables which are reported to affect CEO option exercise: 
returnt-1, returnt-2, log (asset)t-1, ROAt-1, ROAt-2, sale growtht-1, casht-1, volatilityt-1, log 
(1+CEO age)t-1, female dummy, and CEO/chairman duality, along with year fixed effects 
and industry fixed effects.30 
Panel A of Table 8 provides the results. As expected, the award variable is 
positive but statistically insignificant. In other words, winning a prestigious award does 
not have a meaningful effect on managerial overconfidence, suggesting that 
overconfidence is not the main source of the positive effect on innovation.   
I further investigate whether the effect of the award on innovation still remains 
significant after eliminating the effects of pre-existing managerial overconfidence prior to 
receiving an award. To determine this, I employ both a propensity score matching and a 
Heckman two-stage regression approach during the sample period 1992-2002. In the 
propensity score matching, I partition the sample into two groups (firms with vs. firms 
without overconfident CEOs) and I rematch actual award-winners with non-winners 
within each group. The results of the propensity score matching analysis (not tabulated) 
suggests that even after controlling for the CEO overconfidence effect, award-winners 
still produce more and better quality patents than the predicted winners, and the estimates 
of the difference between the two groups are significant at the 1% level. In a Heckman 
selection model, I include an overconfidence variable as an additional explanatory 
variable. The result of the two-stage regression (Panel B of Table 8) shows that there are 
still significantly positive effects of winning an award on patenting activities for the first 
                                                 
      30 Descriptions of the variables are in Appendix A. 
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three years following the award, even after controlling for the CEO overconfidence 
effect. The economic magnitude and statistical significance are quite similar to previous 
results without controlling for overconfidence. The evidence in Table 8 suggests that the 
positive effects of receiving a prestigious award on innovation outcomes are not mainly 
driven by CEO overconfidence, and the effects still exist even after controlling for the 
effect of overconfidence on innovation. 
4.6. The Award Effect on Innovation and Institutional Ownership 
The evidence from this study, thus far, suggests that superstar CEOs who win 
awards are better innovators in terms of both the quantity and the quality of their 
innovation.  In this section, I examine whether the magnitude and significance of the 
positive effect of CEO awards on innovation differ across a measure of managerial long-
term incentives: institutional ownership.  
The innovation literature has also explored the relationship between effective 
monitoring of CEOs and innovation. In this study, I focus on institutional holdings as a 
proxy for a firm’s level of effective monitoring. Edmans (2009), in his theoretical model, 
contends that blockholders have strong incentives to collect costly information about the 
fundamental value of the firm and, in turn, their trades help stock prices reflect the 
fundamental value of the firm rather than short-term earnings. Thus, he demonstrates that 
blockholders encourage managers to focus on the long-term value of the firm rather than 
its short-term value. Aghion et al. (2013) examine whether institutional ownership affects 
a firm’s innovation decisions and show that there is a positive relationship between 
institutional holdings and innovation. Further, they propose two plausible hypotheses to 
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explain the source of the positive effect of institutional holdings on innovation: 
managerial slack (institutional investors push lazy CEOs to innovate more) and career 
concerns (institutional investors monitor CEOs more effectively using better information 
and abilities). Using the relationship between institutional holdings and product market 
competition for managerial innovation incentives, they conclude that the positive effect 
of institutional ownership on innovation is stronger in more competitive markets, which 
suggests that product market competition and institutional holdings complement each 
other. In other words, institutional investors encourage CEOs to innovate more, not by 
forcing lazy CEOs to innovate, but by protecting them from bad luck that happens for 
purely stochastic reasons. Manso (2011), in his principal-agent theoretical model, also 
posits that timely feedback by the principal (e.g., blockholders) on performance motivates 
the agent (managers) to innovate. The existing research discussed above suggests that 
institutional ownership provides more job security to managers and relieves managerial 
short-termism.  
Based on the literature discussed above, I expect the effect of winning a high-
profile award on innovation to vary across firms with different levels of institutional 
ownership. However, it is not clear whether the positive effect of winning an award is 
stronger or weaker for firms with more effective monitoring by institutional investors, as 
this depends on whether winning an award and institutional ownership are substitutes or 
complements for managerial long-term incentives. If they are substitutes, the additional 
effect of winning an award should be smaller for CEOs who already have sufficient long-
term incentives by high institutional ownership. If they are complements, the more relief 
from managerial short-termism there is, the more long-term incentives managers will 
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have. In other words, the additional effect of winning an award should be larger because 
high institutional ownership boosts the impact of award-winning on the CEOs’ long-term 
incentives. 
I collect institutional ownership data from Thomson Reuters Ownership Database. 
Since the database provides quarterly institutional holdings, I use the institutional 
holdings for a quarter prior to the CEO awards. I partition the sample into two groups 
(low institutional ownership and high institutional ownership) at the median of 
institutional holdings. I rematch actual award-winners with predicted award-winners 
within each group. Table 9 reports the matching estimates by high- and low-institutional 
ownership groups. For all of the matching algorithms (10-neighbor matching is not 
tabulated), the effects of awards on both a quantity and quality measure of innovation are 
significant during the four years following the award for both groups at the 10% level, 
except for the effect at year t+4 for the high institutional ownership group. However, the 
effect of winning an award on innovation is significantly larger for the low institutional 
ownership group than it is for the high institutional ownership group at the 1% level (for 
single-nearest neighbor matching) during the four years following the award, indicating 
that winning an award and institutional ownership are a substitute for managerial long-
term incentives. In other words, CEOs who are, ex ante, provided with long-term 
incentives by high institutional ownership will have a small additional impact of winning 
an award on innovation than CEOs in firms with low institutional ownership.  
In sum, the evidence presented here is consistent with prior literature on the role 
of institutional investors on corporate decisions; institutional investors play an important 
role in motivating managers so that they do not make myopic decisions. Furthermore, the 
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heterogeneous effect of winning a high-profile award on innovation across firms with 
different levels of institutional ownership suggests that institutional ownership and 
winning an award are substitutes for managerial long-term incentives: institutional 
ownership mitigates the effect of winning a high-profile award on innovation. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, I examine how a shift in CEO status as a result of winning a high-
profile award affects a firm’s innovation decisions. Two opposing views in the context of 
CEO power (greater job security) predict different consequences of winning such 
prestigious awards on a firm’s innovation. The agency view predicts that CEOs who win 
awards (superstar CEOs) innovate less due to self-dealing behaviors and because they use 
their heightened power within the firms to take private benefits of control at the cost of 
the shareholders. In contrast, the managerial myopia view suggests that superstar CEOs 
innovate more. A decline in the threat of job termination enables a superstar CEO to take 
on more long-term and innovative projects with less pressure on their short-term 
performance. In addition to the managerial myopia hypothesis, the managerial 
overconfidence view (Hirshleifer et al., 2012), also predicts a positive effect of winning a 
prestigious award on innovation if award-wining CEOs become overconfident after the 
award.  
Using a propensity score matching as the main identification strategy, I find that 
CEOs who win high-profile awards, on average, innovate more, in terms of the number 
of patents and citations per patent, than their benchmarks. The finding that superstar 
CEOs are better innovators is robust using a different treatment effect model assumption 
(temporary shift model), broader sample periods, and a different estimation technique (a 
Heckman selection model).  
I then explore a potential source for the positive award effect on innovation. I 
determine that there is a clear shift in CEO power after CEOs win an award and that they 
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tend to extract rents and are less likely to be fired by the boards even when they 
underperform. However, I fail to find evidence that winning a prestigious award drives 
CEOs to become more overconfident. I also confirm that the positive effects of winning 
an award on innovation remain similar, even after controlling for the effect of CEO 
overconfidence.  
Lastly, I explore whether the effects of awards on innovation are heterogeneous 
by institutional ownership. I find that the positive award-winning effect on innovation is 
weaker for firms with high institutional ownership, concluding that winning a prestigious 
award and institutional ownership are substitutes for managerial incentives for long-term 
growth.  
The results given in this paper is consistent with the managerial myopia view that 
a CEO who achieves greater job security (and, in turn, reduced managerial myopia) as a 
result of winning a high-profile award promotes more innovation.31 This study 
contributes to the extant literature by using a unique and more recent measure of CEO 
entrenchment (i.e. prestigious CEO awards) and reliable long-term performance measures 
(i.e. innovation).  
The evidence here sheds light on the positive role of managerial entrenchment and 
superstar status – seeking long-term growth and success by engaging in more innovative 
projects – in contrast to the findings in previous literature, and it helps resolve the current 
                                                 
        31 The evidence in this paper can be reconciled with Atanassov’s (2013) study in that the shock used in 
this study is an example of an internal governance mechanism that affects CEO behavior through the board 
of directors, while hostile takeovers are an example of an external governance mechanism. In addition, 
winning prestigious CEO awards causes greater investor attention (and, in turn, increases monitoring), 
which incentivizes award-winning CEOs to maximize the long-term value of their firms. In contrast, 
enacting anti-takeover state-level laws might be seen as “a windfall” by investors so they do not pay much 
attention to monitor the CEOs’ behaviors. 
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puzzle of why many firms have actively chosen to weaken shareholder rights and given 
excessive power to their CEOs over their boards.  
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APPENDIX A 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS 
Variables 
 
Description 
First-award dummy  
(permanent model) 
 Indicator variable: 1 for all the years after a CEO wins a first award at t and 0 for all non-winners 
First-award dummy  
(temporary model) 
 Indicator variable: 1 if a CEO wins a first award at t and 0 otherwise 
Multiple-award dummy  Indicator variable: 1 if a CEO wins any award at t and 0 otherwise 
Patent t 
 
Number of patents for each firm at year t, scaled by the total number of patents for all firms at year t 
Citation/patent t  
Number of citations per patent for each firm at year t, scaled by the citation measure by the average 
number of citations per patent at year t 
 
Sales 
 
Firm sales are in logarithmic 
Stock return  
Total compound returns prior to the award month adjusted by Carhart’s four-factors (Rm-Rf, SMB, 
HML, and UMD) for each year which are collected from the French’s online website 
 
R&D expense 
 
Reported R&D spending scaled by total assets 
Leverage 
 
Total long-term debt over total assets 
Profitability 
 
Earnings before interest depreciation taxes and amortization (EBITDA) divided by total assets 
Tangibility 
 
Net property, plant, and equipment over total assets 
Herfindahl index 
 
Sum of squared shares of the sales for all companies within the same 4 digit SIC level 
Firm age 
 1) Number of years since the firm’s initial public offering or 2) number of years elapsed since a firm 
first appears in the CRSP database (if the initial public offering date is not available) 
 
Market capitalization  
Price multiplied by shares outstanding measured at the end of the last fiscal year prior to the award 
month 
Book-to-market  Stockholders’ equity over market equity 
Tobin’s Q  Total assets plus market equity minus book equity, divided by total assets 
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Asset growth  (Total asset at t – total asset at t-1) / total asset at t-1 
Firm risk  Standard deviation of most recent 3 years of monthly stock returns 
G-index  Governance index which is constructed by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) 
CEO delta 
 
Sensitivity of a CEO’s stock and option value ($ thousands) to a 1% change in stock price  
CEO vega 
 
Sensitivity of a CEO’s stock and option value ($ thousands) to a 1% change in stock return volatility  
CEO total compensation  
Sum of salary, bonus, other annual compensation, restricted stock grants, LTIP payouts, options grants, 
and all other total compensation 
CEO cash compensation   Salary plus bonus, presented in $K 
CEO age 
 
Measured in years as reported by Execucomp database 
CEO tenure 
 
Number of years that a given CEO has held the position 
CEO/Chairman duality  Indicator variable: 1 if a CEO is also a chairman of a board and 0 otherwise 
Female  Indicator variable: 1 if a CEO is female and 0 for male 
CEO turnover  
Categorical variable: 1 for exogenous turnover (scheduled retirement, death, etc.), 2 for unclassified 
turnover, 3 for forced turnover (clearly stated in the Factiva that a CEO was fired, forced to leave, or 
left following a policy disagreement), and 0 for no turnover events. 
Poor performance  Indicator variable: 1 if a firm belongs to the bottom 25% group based on ROA and 0 otherwise 
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APPENDIX B 
PROPENSITY SCORE MATCHING 
In this study, I examine whether a shift in CEO status as a result of winning a 
high-profile award affects innovation decisions. In the analytical framework, the 
treatment effect (effect of winning an award) is the difference between potential 
outcomes (innovation outputs) with and without treatment for group i:  
 
where Y represents potential outcomes and 0 and 1 denotes non-treatment and treatment 
group respectively. 
Each group is identified as a combination of a CEO and a firm.32 The goal of this 
study is to examine the average treatment effect on the treated groups (ATT): 
 
where T=1 refers to the treatment. 
In my study, I compare post-award innovation outputs of an award winner’s firm 
to the counterfactual firm (i.e., the same firm had the CEO not received 
the award) . However, because the counterfactual firm’s innovation outputs 
are not observable, appropriate benchmark groups corresponding to each treatment group 
should be selected by an empirical specification. Thus, I employ a propensity score 
matching technique (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) to pick benchmark groups similar to 
treatment groups. A propensity score matching technique is preferred over parametric 
                                                 
       32 For example, if a firm has three CEOs in its history, I identify the three CEOs as separate groups 
since each CEO has heterogeneous innovation decisions, given his/her firm’s characteristics and 
operational environment. Likewise, if a CEO has served for three firms in his/her career, that CEO belongs 
to three different groups since he or she might make different innovation decisions, given that each firm has 
different characteristics and a different operational environment. 
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regressions for the following reasons: A propensity score matching procedure, which is a 
non-parametric technique, does not need to impose a functional form on outcomes which 
would be required in a multivariate regression framework. In addition, explanatory 
variables in a regression are usually correlated with an error term, resulting in an 
inconsistent and biased estimate on treatment effects. 
The propensity score matching procedure has two stages. In the first stage, a 
propensity score for each group is estimated by running a logit (or probit) regression 
where the dependent variable is a treatment dummy (whether a CEO wins an award or 
not at year t) and independent variables are matching variables by which the treatment 
and control groups are matched. In the second stage, a treatment effect (award-winning 
effect) on outcome variables (innovation outputs) is estimated after treatment groups are 
matched with control groups based on the propensity scores. 
A variety of algorithms in the propensity score matching technique have been 
developed in the econometric literature in order to choose the best similar control groups 
based on propensity scores. Among these algorithms, I choose a single nearest neighbor 
matching, N-neighbor matching, and a kernel matching algorithm for my analysis. The 
single nearest neighbor matching selects a benchmark whose propensity score is the 
closest to the treatment group. The N-neighbor matching chooses multiple benchmark 
groups after it ranks all control groups based on the distance of their propensity scores 
from that of the treatment group. Thus, it provides multiple benchmark groups per 
treatment group. The kernel matching is a non-parametric matching procedure that 
provides the weighted average of the counterfactual outcomes of all control groups based 
on the distance of propensity scores between treatment and control groups. Thus, the 
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kernel matching algorithm uses more information from all control groups than a single or 
an N-neighbor matching method and, as a result, it reduces the variance of estimates. 
However, the single nearest neighbor matching algorithm and the N-neighbor matching 
algorithm have a lower bias than the kernel matching algorithm since kernel matching 
might use many bad matches. Therefore, in this paper, I employ all three matching 
algorithms (a single nearest neighbor, N-nearest neighbor, and a kernel matching) to 
estimate the effects of awards on post innovation activities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
48 
APPENDIX C 
FIGURES AND TABLES 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Mean number of patents 
The graph plots the mean number of patents for first-time award-winners, predicted winners, and 
non-winners during the four-year period following the awards from 1992 to 2002. The number 
of patents for each firm at year t is divided by the mean number of patents of all firms for the 
same year, to account for a potential truncation bias. 
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Figure 2: Mean CEO total and cash compensation 
The graph plots mean CEO total and cash compensation for first-time award-winners, predicted 
winners, and non-winners from 1992 to 2011. CEO total compensation (tdc1 from Execucomp) 
is the sum of salary, bonus, other annual compensation, restricted stock grants, LTIP payouts, 
options grants, and all other total compensation. The total compensation is reported in 
increments of $1000. 
 
 
 
50 
 
Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
The table reports summary statistics for first-time award-winners, all award-winners, and all non-winners in the sample. 
The CEO and firm variables are described in Appendix A. All variables are measured at year t-1 where awards are granted 
at t.  
Variables 
  First-time winners (N=163)   All winners (N=263)   Non-winners (N=23,441) 
 
Mean Median Std. Dev. 
 
Mean Median Std. Dev. 
 
Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Matching variables 
Sales ($ in thousands) 
 
14,780 5,454 30,353 
 
18,739 7,191 32,316 
 
3,880 963 11,854 
Past 1-year return (%) 
 
57.62 23.49 217.92 
 
50.26 24.88 175.56 
 
21.11 11.93 66.69 
R&D expense/assets 
 
0.032 0.004 0.048 
 
0.035 0.007 0.049 
 
0.031 0.000 0.073 
Leverage 
 
0.23 0.19 0.17 
 
0.22 0.19 0.18 
 
0.23 0.21 0.20 
Profitability 
 
0.15 0.15 0.10 
 
0.16 0.16 0.10 
 
0.13 0.13 0.13 
Tangibility 
 
0.31 0.27 0.23 
 
0.29 0.24 0.23 
 
0.29 0.22 0.24 
Cash/assets 
 
0.08 0.05 0.08 
 
0.08 0.05 0.09 
 
0.09 0.04 0.11 
Firm age (years) 
 
28.73 23 22.72 
 
29.66 23 23.27 
 
21.35 16 18.31 
CEO delta ($) 
 
3,945 520 16,729 
 
8,118 790 29,969 
 
1,111 196 11,625 
CEO vega ($) 
 
196.54 77.84 332.45 
 
263.71 88.00 530.00 
 
113.05 37.89 269.10 
CEO age (years) 
 
54.34 55 7.14 
 
54.79 55 8.15 
 
55.17 55 7.58 
CEO tenure (years)   5.89 4 5.97   7.72 5 7.34   7.13 5 7.34 
             Other firm and CEO characteristics 
Market cap. 
 
26,525 10,471 54,278 
 
37,880 13,631 65,387 
 
5,397 1,127 18,529 
Total assets 
 
27,089 5,712 66,094 
 
41,614 9,861 113,709 
 
10,010 1,195 52,291 
Past 2-year return (%) 
 
141.05 57.31 420.08 
 
134.80 57.58 374.00 
 
50.15 25.96 157.33 
Past 3-year return (%) 
 
204.65 80.82 538.38 
 
244.84 86.01 1,037.13 
 
81.57 39.76 235.17 
Book-to-market ratio 
 
0.33 0.31 0.22 
 
0.31 0.28 0.21 
 
0.50 0.44 0.76 
Tobin's Q 
 
3.74 1.95 8.83 
 
3.89 2.02 8.56 
 
2.08 1.51 2.25 
G index 
 
9.35 9 2.78 
 
8.97 9 2.70 
 
9.26 9 2.69 
CEO total compensation($) 
 
8,492 3,877 13,897 
 
12,440 4,357 29,961 
 
4,148 1,957 9,955 
CEO cash compensation ($)   2,017 1,530 1,957   2,432 1,690 2,702   1,228 845 1,691 
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Table 2 
First Stage: Logit Regression 
This table reports logit regression results. The dependent variable is an indicator variable of whether a 
CEO wins an award at year t. The explanatory variables are those used as matching variables for a 
propensity score matching. The selection criteria for the matching variables are those which affect either 
likelihood to win awards (participation in treatment groups) or innovation activities (outcomes). The 
variables used in the first stage regression are described in the Appendix. Standard errors are clustered by 
groups (combination of a CEO and a firm) and are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Variables Coefficient 
 
(Robust SEs) 
Ln(sales) 0.885*** 
 
(0.089) 
Prior 1-Year Return 1.000*** 
 
(0.117) 
R&D Expense/Assets 0.924 
 (2.300) 
Leverage -1.329 
 
(0.914) 
Profitability -0.501 
 
(1.410) 
Tangibility 0.984 
 
(0.734) 
Cash/assets 2.127* 
 
(1.182) 
Ln(1+firm age) -0.148 
 (0.094) 
Ln(1+CEO delta) 0.529*** 
 
(0.082) 
Ln(1+CEO vega) -0.029 
 (0.061) 
Ln(1+CEO age) -0.083 
 (0.101) 
Ln(1+CEO tenure) -1.841** 
 
(0.835) 
Industry dummies YES 
Year dummies YES 
Pseudo R2 0.29 
Observations 12,435 
Groups 3,092 
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Table 3 
Post Innovation to CEO Awards 
This table shows innovation outputs between actual award-winners and predicted winners in the 
permanent shift model framework. An award indicator variable is set to one for all CEO-year 
observations after year t when a CEO wins a first award and set to zero for all non-winners. Matching 
variables and a matching procedure are described in the Appendix. Predicted winners are selected by a 
single nearest neighbor, multiple nearest neighbors, and a kernel propensity score matching procedure. 
The outcome variables are the scaled number of patents and the scaled number of citations per patent. 
The matching estimates represent differences in the innovation outputs between actual winners and 
predicted winners. The number of observations in this table only include groups which lie within a 
common support region. The standard errors are estimated by bootstrapping and are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Outcome 
Variables 
N  
(On Support) 
Single Nearest 
Neighbor  
10 - Neighbors 
 
Kernel 
(Gaussian) 
Matching Estimate 
 
Matching Estimate 
 
Matching 
Estimate 
Patent t+1 759 
0.0968*** 
 
0.0956*** 
 
 0.0992*** 
(0.0172) 
 
(0.0111) 
 
(0.0104) 
Patent t+2 739 
0.1087*** 
 
0.1180*** 
 
 0.1135*** 
(0.0185) 
 
(0.0124) 
 
(0.0117) 
Patent t+3 719 
0.1267*** 
 
0.1261*** 
 
 0.1242*** 
(0.0206) 
 
(0.0139) 
 
(0.0131) 
Patent t+4 702 
0.1173*** 
 
0.1378*** 
 
 0.1332*** 
(0.0225) 
 
(0.0151) 
 
(0.0144) 
       
Citation/Patent t+1 759 
0.1484*** 
 
0.1436*** 
 
 0.1330*** 
(0.0447) 
 
(0.0278) 
 
(0.0257) 
Citation/Patent t+2 739 
0.1688*** 
 
0.1314*** 
 
 0.1348*** 
(0.0423) 
 
(0.0269) 
 
(0.0248) 
Citation/Patent t+3 719 
0.1559*** 
 
0.1270*** 
 
 0.1297*** 
(0.0421) 
 
(0.0261) 
 
(0.0242) 
Citation/Patent t+4 702 
0.1531*** 
 
0.1227*** 
 
 0.1082*** 
(0.0366)   (0.0243)   (0.0227) 
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Table 4 
Robustness Check 1: Temporary Shift Model 
This table presents the results of innovation outputs around actual winners and predicted winners when 
CEOs’ first awards are considered (Panel A) and all multiple awards to the same CEOs (Panel B) are 
included in the sample in the temporary shift model framework. Predicted winners (P) are selected by a 
single nearest neighbor, multiple nearest neighbor, and a kernel propensity score matching procedure. 
The matching estimates represent differences in the innovation outputs between actual winners and 
predicted winners. The number of observations in this table only include groups which lie within a 
common support region. The standard errors are estimated by bootstrapping and are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: First Award      
Outcome 
Variables 
N  
(On Support) 
Single Nearest 
Neighbor   
10- Neighbors 
  
Kernel 
(Gaussian) 
Matching Estimate 
 
Matching Estimate 
 
Matching 
Estimate 
Patent t+1 154 
0.0836*** 
 
0.0927*** 
 
0.0880*** 
(0.0323 ) 
 
(0.0237 ) 
 
(0.0229 ) 
Patent t+2 149 
0.1397*** 
 
0.1169*** 
 
0.1176*** 
(0.0349) 
 
(0.0265) 
 
(0.0255) 
Patent t+3 142 
0.1321*** 
 
0.1140*** 
 
0.1082*** 
(0.0387) 
 
(0.0300) 
 
(0.0289) 
Patent t+4 137 
0.1305*** 
 
0.1015*** 
 
0.1091*** 
(0.0425) 
 
(0.0328) 
 
(0.0316) 
Citation/Patent t+1 154 
0.1797*** 
 
0.1393*** 
 
0.1192*** 
(0.0801) 
 
(0.0597) 
 
(0.0427) 
Citation/Patent t+2 149 
0.1753*** 
 
0.2009*** 
 
0.1775*** 
(0.0816) 
 
(0.0585) 
 
(0.0560) 
Citation/Patent t+3 142 
0.1712*** 
 
0.1545*** 
 
0.1651*** 
(0.0813) 
 
(0.0608) 
 
(0.0585) 
Citation/Patent t+4 137 
0.0305 
 
0.1300*** 
 
0.0983** 
(0.0812)  (0.0548)  (0.0445) 
 
Panel B: Multiple Awards      
Outcome 
Variables 
N  
(On 
Support) 
Single Nearest 
Neighbor  
10 - Neighbors 
 
Kernel (Gaussian) 
Matching Estimate 
 
Matching 
Estimate  
Matching Estimate 
Patent t+1 243 
0.1005*** 
 
0.1104*** 
 
0.1068*** 
(0.0135) 
 
(0.0114) 
 
(0.0116) 
Patent t+2 236 
0.1523*** 
 
0.1339*** 
 
0.1309*** 
(0.0317) 
 
(0.0142) 
 
(0.0109) 
Patent t+3 229 
0.1163*** 
 
0.1323*** 
 
0.1352*** 
(0.0206) 
 
(0.0174) 
 
(0.0080) 
Patent t+4 222 
0.1029*** 
 
0.1451*** 
 
0.1454*** 
(0.0246) 
 
(0.0240) 
 
(0.0137) 
Citation/Patent t+1 243 
         0.1347** 
 
0.1728*** 
 
0.1711*** 
         (0.0568) 
 
(0.0354) 
 
(0.0322) 
Citation/Patent t+2 236 
         0.1243** 
 
0.1614*** 
 
0.1978*** 
         (0.0609) 
 
(0.0365) 
 
(0.0293) 
Citation/Patent t+3 229 
         01808*** 
 
0.1847*** 
 
0.1874*** 
         (0.0659) 
 
(0.0319) 
 
(0.0314) 
Citation/Patent t+4 222 
         0.1562*** 
 
0.1017*** 
 
0.1171*** 
         (0.0527)   (0.0272)   (0.0254) 
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Table 5 
Robustness Check 2: Subsample Periods Analysis  
This table presents award-winning treatment effects on long-run innovation decisions over the periods beginning in 1976. Panel A shows treatment effects, in 
the permanent shift model, over the period 1976-1991 and the period 1976-2002. Panel B reports award-winning effects on innovation over the two periods 
when the temporary effects on winning an award are assumed. The division of the sample periods is based on availability of CEO information from Execucomp 
database. Matched groups for each treatment group are selected by a single nearest neighbor, 10-nearest neighbors (not reported), and kernel propensity score 
matching procedure (with Gaussian kernel function). Matching procedures are similar to the previous analyses. The outcome variables are the number of patents 
(scaled by the average number of patents in the same year) and the number of citations per patent. The matching estimates represent differences in the 
innovation outputs between actual winners and predicted winners. The number of observations in this table only include groups which lie within a 
common support region. The standard errors are estimated by bootstrapping and are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent significance at 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
Period: 1976 ~ 1991 
 
Period: 1976 ~ 2002 
Outcome 
Variables 
N  
(On 
Support) 
Single Nearest 
Neighbor 
 
Kernel 
(Gaussian)   N  
(On Support) 
Single Nearest 
Neighbor 
 
Kernel (Gaussian) 
Matching 
Estimate  
Matching 
Estimate 
 
Matching Estimate 
 
Matching Estimate 
Patent t+1 632 
0.0993*** 
 
0.1063*** 
 
2187 
0.1106*** 
 
0.1176*** 
(0.0137) 
 
(0.0078) 
 
(0.0102) 
 
(0.0059) 
Patent t+2 623 
0.1017*** 
 
0.1211*** 
 
2131 
0.1291*** 
 
0.1343*** 
(0.0141) 
 
(0.0056) 
 
(0.0114) 
 
(0.0066) 
Patent t+3 613 
0.1254*** 
 
0.1421*** 
 
2075 
0.1436*** 
 
0.1504*** 
(0.0112) 
 
(0.0075) 
 
(0.0124) 
 
(0.0074) 
Patent t+4 600 
0.1647*** 
 
0.1617*** 
 
2020 
0.1563*** 
 
0.1630*** 
(0.0198) 
 
(0.0080) 
 
(0.0138) 
 
(0.0082) 
          
Citation/Patent t+1 632 
0.1017*** 
 
0.1214*** 
 
2188 
0.1244*** 
 
0.1238*** 
(0.0359) 
 
(0.0140) 
 
(0.0248) 
 
(0.0077) 
Citation/Patent t+2 624 
        0.1211*** 
 
0.1204*** 
 
2134 
0.1158*** 
 
0.1296*** 
(0.0276) 
 
(0.0134) 
 
(0.0243) 
 
(0.0084) 
Citation/Patent t+3 615 
0.1581*** 
 
0.1210*** 
 
2079 
0.1441*** 
 
0.1281*** 
(0.0307) 
 
(0.0160) 
 
(0.0233) 
 
(0.0076) 
Citation/Patent t+4 602 
0.1091*** 
 
0.1371*** 
 
2025 
0.1563*** 
 
0.1271*** 
(0.0358) 
 
(0.0145) 
 
(0.0231) 
 
(0.01030) 
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Table 6  
Robustness Check 3: Heckman Selection Model 
This table reports estimates of the effects of winning an award on innovation outcomes in the Heckman selection model. This regression model includes 
two steps. In the first step, it runs a probit regression in which the dependent variable is an award dummy in the permanent shift model and the 
independent variables are 1-year Carhart’s four-factor risk-adjusted stock returns prior to an award, log(market capitalization), book-to-market, log(CEO 
age), log(1+CEO tenure). The estimated probability of winning an award for each observation is included in the second stage as a key independent 
variable (Award) where the dependent variable is innovation outcomes year t+1 to year t+4. I also include control variables that affect a firm’s 
innovation decisions in the second stage. To further control an omitted variable bias problem, I include lagged patenting activities and firm dummies in 
the regression. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent significance 
at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Variable  Ln(1+Pat t+1) Ln(1+Pat t+2) Ln(1+Pat t+3) Ln(1+Pat t+4)  Ln(1+  t+1) Ln(1+   t+2) Ln(1+   t+3) Ln(1+   t+4) 
Award  0.0846*** 0.108*** 0.0774** 0.0526  0.0664* 0.0894*** 0.0625* -0.0151 
  (0.0275) (0.0295) (0.0317) (0.0333)  (0.0344) (0.0344) (0.0350) (0.0361) 
Ln(1+Pat t-1)  0.751*** 0.555*** 0.266*** 0.0107      
 (0.0252) (0.0297) (0.0338) (0.0378)      
Ln(1+Cit/Pat t-1)       0.586*** 0.346*** -0.0118 -0.234*** 
      (0.0284) (0.0288) (0.0327) (0.0367) 
Ln(Sales) 
 0.0362*** 0.0237*** 0.0174*** 0.0162**  0.0116** 0.0137** 0.0172*** 0.0260*** 
 (0.00484) (0.00548) (0.00634) (0.00713)  (0.00583) (0.00595) (0.00637) (0.00690) 
R&D 
 0.0680 0.150 0.326*** 0.294**  0.602*** 0.818*** 0.848*** 0.435*** 
 (0.0814) (0.0916) (0.103) (0.116)  (0.0995) (0.102) (0.108) (0.117) 
Leverage 
 -0.0639*** -0.0649*** -0.0609** -0.0644**  -0.0413* -0.0500** -0.0725*** -0.0482* 
 (0.0191) (0.0216) (0.0250) (0.0284)  (0.0231) (0.0236) (0.0254) (0.0275) 
Tangibility 
 0.0788*** 0.0774** 0.0792** 0.0908**  0.0906** 0.123*** 0.101*** 0.0954** 
 (0.0292) (0.0326) (0.0369) (0.0411)  (0.0356) (0.0360) (0.0380) (0.0408) 
Profitability 
 -0.0761*** 0.00899 0.0990*** 0.145***  0.112*** 0.228*** 0.328*** 0.351*** 
 (0.0295) (0.0328) (0.0372) (0.0417)  (0.0361) (0.0369) (0.0390) (0.0418) 
Cash 
 -0.0123 0.00312 0.0326 0.00471  0.0225 0.0195 -0.0226 0.00583 
 (0.0268) (0.0303) (0.0354) (0.0401)  (0.0325) (0.0330) (0.0354) (0.0387) 
Ln(1+Firm age) 
 0.0551*** 0.0560*** 0.0565*** 0.0467***  -0.0187** -0.0226** -0.0153 -0.0147 
 (0.00780) (0.00890) (0.0104) (0.0116)  (0.00930) (0.00938) (0.0101) (0.0111) 
Ln(1+CEO delta) 
 0.00684*** 0.00450* -9.67e-05 -0.00173  0.00983*** 0.00933*** 0.00113 -0.00145 
 (0.00241) (0.00271) (0.00310) (0.00342)  (0.00292) (0.00296) (0.00316) (0.00341) 
Ln(1+CEO vega) 
 0.00411** 0.00469** 0.00503* 0.00189  -0.000761 -0.00302 0.00388 0.00333 
 (0.00203) (0.00230) (0.00264) (0.00290)  (0.00244) (0.00247) (0.00266) (0.00288) 
Ln(1+CEO  0.000604 -0.00210 0.00131 0.00409  -0.00448 -0.0102** -0.00221 0.00231 
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tenure)  (0.00324) (0.00363) (0.00412) (0.00460)  (0.00395) (0.00401) (0.00424) (0.00455) 
Ln(1+CEO age) 
 -0.0438 -0.0758** -0.0795** -0.0800*  -0.0336 -0.00354 0.0119 0.0272 
 (0.0266) (0.0306) (0.0357) (0.0413)  (0.0321) (0.0327) (0.0350) (0.0385) 
           
Firm fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  17,796 15,622 13,513 11,545  18,974 18,015 15,963 13,934 
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Table 7 
CEO Award, CEO Power, and Job Security 
This table presents how a shift in CEO power as a result of winning a prestigious award affects CEO total compensation and CEO turnover. Panel A 
reports a propensity score matching result on a change in CEO total compensation between first-time award-winners and predicted winners. In the 
first stage, I estimate a propensity score in which a dependent variable is a first-award indicator variable (one for all CEO-year observations after 
year t when CEOs win their first-time award and zero otherwise). The independent variables used as a matching variable are log(asset), return t-1, 
return t, ROA t-1, ROA t, sales growth, cash, firm risk, log(CEO age), log(1+CEO tenure), CEO gender, and CEO/chairman duality (along with year 
dummies and industry dummies at the two-digit SIC level). In the second stage, the predicted award-winners are selected in the same year and same 
industry group at two-digit SIC level with award-winners by using a single nearest neighbor and a kernel propensity score matching algorithm. To 
further eliminate heterogeneity of total compensation between actual winners and predicted winners, I sort the sample CEOs into deciles of 
compensation, and then I force actual winners and predicted winners to match within the same decile group. The outcome variables are (excess) total 
compensation (tdc1 measure from Execucomp). I estimate excess compensation following the estimation method by Core, Guay, and Larcker (2008).  
The number of observations in this table only include groups which lie within a common support region. The standard errors are estimated by 
bootstrapping and are reported in parentheses. Panel B presents multinomial logistic regression results on how winning an award affects CEO 
turnover. The dependent variable is a CEO turnover equal to one for exogenous turnover (scheduled retirement, death, etc.), equal to two for 
unclassified turnover, equal to three for forced turnover (fired by the board), and equal to zero for no turnover events. Thus, the reference category is 
no turnover events. The poor performance dummy is equal to one if a firm belongs to the bottom 25% group based on ROA and zero otherwise. The 
interest variable in the regression is an interaction term between the first award dummy and poor performance dummy. All other variables in Table I 
are described in the Appendix. The standard errors are clustered at the group (CEO/firm) level.  ***, **, and * represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Changes in compensation 
Outcome variables 
N (on 
support) 
Nearest-neighbor matching   Kernel matching 
Award 
winners 
(W) 
Predicted 
winners 
(P) 
Difference 
(W-P)  
Award 
winners 
(W) 
Predicted 
winners 
(P) 
Difference 
(W-P) 
  
∆ total compensation [t-1, t+1] 165 $2,175.92  -$2,413.69 $4,589.54*** 
 
$2,175.92  -$1,745.10  $3,921.02*** 
    
($1,654.89) 
   
($1,480.58) 
∆ total compensation [t-1, t+2] 138 $3,534.47  -$1,490.99  $5,025.46***  
 
$3,534.47 -$1,438.82 $4,973.29*** 
    
($2,268.85) 
   
($1,650.46) 
         ∆ excess compensation [t-1, t+1] 192 $1,705.46  -$1,839.61  $3,545.37*  
 
$1,705.46  -$1,950.78 $3,656.54***  
    
($2,000.71) 
   
($1,667.55) 
∆ excess compensation [t-1, t+2] 178 $2,251.53  -$5,096.51  $7,321.04*** 
 
$2,251.53  -$2,204.70  $4,456.22*** 
        ($1,946.46)       ($1,431.50) 
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Panel B: Multinomial logit regression: Post-CEO turnover after awards 
 Year t+1  Year t+2 
Variable Exogenous Unclassified Forced  Exogenous Unclassified Forced 
        
First award dummy -0.627 0.132 -0.196  -0.0838 -0.447 -1.057 
 (0.633) (0.384) (0.728)  (0.476) (0.527) (1.001) 
Poor performance dummy -0.399** 0.0946 0.541***  0.121 0.218* -0.144 
 (0.177) (0.114) (0.186)  (0.182) (0.129) (0.250) 
(First award)*(Poor 
performance) 
1.872* -0.405 -11.38***  0.704 -10.60*** -9.887*** 
 (0.996) (1.161) (0.829)  (1.072) (0.634) (1.118) 
Industry-adjusted Return -0.396 0.123 -1.740**  0.590 0.307 0.776 
 (0.617) (0.448) (0.813)  (0.626) (0.465) (0.964) 
Industry Return 0.151 -0.328 -1.602  0.688 -0.465 2.248* 
 (0.894) (0.572) (1.066)  (0.875) (0.616) (1.237) 
Industry-adjusted ROA -0.937 -0.569 -1.005  0.897 -0.630 -1.751* 
 (1.108) (0.587) (0.986)  (1.145) (0.597) (0.952) 
Industry ROA -0.341 -0.334 -1.301  0.314 -0.473 -1.364 
 (1.252) (0.712) (1.261)  (1.301) (0.780) (1.392) 
Log(Asset) 0.184*** 0.0740** 0.324***  0.171*** 0.0950*** 0.308*** 
 (0.0413) (0.0298) (0.0544)  (0.0434) (0.0326) (0.0593) 
Log(CEO age) 8.246*** 3.740*** -1.076  8.141*** 4.116*** -1.218 
 (0.642) (0.420) (0.683)  (0.692) (0.468) (0.795) 
Log (Tenure) 0.1000 0.0688 -0.0272  0.123* 0.0557 -0.0940 
 (0.0613) (0.0445) (0.0803)  (0.0691) (0.0513) (0.0968) 
CEO/Chairman duality -2.253*** -2.748*** -4.601***  -2.383*** -2.789*** -4.579*** 
 (0.223) (0.223) (1.003)  (0.241) (0.236) (1.002) 
Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes 
Pseudo R2  15.26%    16.18%  
Observations 14,165  11,909 
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Table 8 
Post Innovation to CEO Awards after Controlling for CEO Overconfidence 
This table shows results of the role that managerial overconfidence plays in explaining the observed 
results in Chapter IV. Panel A presents a logit regression examining whether receiving a prestigious award 
affects managerial overconfidence. The dependent variable is an indicator variable of whether a CEO 
becomes overconfident within four years in a given year t. For award-winners, the dependent variable is 
one if a CEO becomes overconfident within four years following the award. A key independent variable is 
the award dummy which is equal to one if a CEO receives an award at year t and zero otherwise. I also 
employ several control variables which are reported to affect CEO option exercise: return t-1, return t-2, log 
(asset) t-1, ROA t-1, ROA t-2, sale growth t-1, cash t-1, volatility t-1, log (1+CEO age) t-1, female dummy, and 
CEO/chairman duality along with year fixed effects and industry fixed effects. Panel B reports estimates 
of the effects of winning an award on innovation after controlling for CEO overconfidence in the 
Heckman selection model. The procedure of the two-stage regression is similar to Table 7. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1% level. Variables are described in more detail in Appendix A. The 
standard errors are estimated by bootstrapping and are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
Panel A: CEO award and overconfidence  
Variables Overconfidence 
Award dummy 0.837 
 (0.627) 
Return t-1 -0.520 
 (0.674) 
Return t-2 -0.440 
 (0.707) 
Ln (Asset) t-1 -0.235*** 
 (0.0674) 
ROA t-1 1.804** 
 (0.894) 
ROA t-2 -2.062** 
 (0.941) 
Sale growth t-1 -0.666* 
 (0.356) 
Cash t-1 -0.283* 
 (0.170) 
Volatility t-1 5.260*** 
 (1.940) 
Ln (1+CEO age) t-1 -0.958 
 (0.675) 
Female -0.952 
 (1.022) 
Duality -0.00216 
 (0.181) 
Year fixed effects Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes 
No. of obs. 6,805 
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Panel B: Heckman selection model: The effect of the award on innovation after controlling for CEO overconfidence
Variable 
 
Ln(1+Pat t+1) Ln(1+Pat t+2) Ln(1+Pat t+3) Ln(1+Pat t+4) 
 
Ln(1+  t+1) Ln(1+   t+2) Ln(1+   t+3) Ln(1+   t+4) 
Award 
 0.0841*** 0.1075*** 0.0760** 0.0515  0.0652* 0.0881** 0.0606* -0.0161 
 (0.0275) (0.0295) (0.0317) (0.0333)  (0.0344) (0.0344) (0.0350) (0.0361) 
Overconfidence 
 0.0090 0.0116* 0.0236*** 0.0355***  0.0133* 0.0209*** 0.0264*** 0.0186** 
 (0.0059) (0.0066) (0.0075) (0.0085)  (0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0076) (0.0082) 
Ln(1+Pat t) 
 0.7507*** 0.5549*** 0.2656*** 0.0110      
 (0.0252) (0.0297) (0.0339) (0.0378)      
Ln(1+Cit/Pat t) 
      0.5855*** 0.3449*** -0.0121 -0.2343*** 
      (0.0284) (0.0288) (0.0327) (0.0367) 
Ln(Sales) 
 0.0366*** 0.0241*** 0.0182*** 0.0169**  0.0122** 0.0147** 0.0185*** 0.0268** 
 (0.0048) (0.0055) (0.0063) (0.0071)  (0.0058) (0.0060) (0.0064) (0.0069) 
R&D 
 0.0673 0.1499 0.3247*** 0.2907**  0.6014*** 0.8177*** 0.8459*** 0.4340*** 
 (0.0814) (0.0916) (0.1033) (0.1161)  (0.0995) (0.1022) (0.1077) (0.1168) 
Leverage 
 -0.0641*** -0.0653*** -0.0612** -0.0640**  -0.0416* -0.0507** -0.0734*** -0.0490* 
 (0.0191) (0.0216) (0.0250) (0.0284)  (0.0231) (0.0236) (0.0254) (0.0275) 
Tangibility 
 0.0796*** 0.0781*** 0.0803** 0.0927**  0.0917*** 0.1250*** 0.1033*** 0.0964** 
 (0.0292) (0.0326) (0.0369) (0.0410)  (0.0356) (0.0360) (0.0380) (0.0408) 
Profitability 
 -0.0772*** 0.0074 0.0965*** 0.1419***  0.1099*** 0.2241*** 0.3245*** 0.3487*** 
 (0.0295) (0.0328) (0.0372) (0.0417)  (0.0362) (0.0369) (0.0390) (0.0418) 
Cash 
 -0.0133 0.0017 0.0292 -0.0005  0.0215 0.0183 -0.0250 0.0035 
 (0.0268) (0.0304) (0.0354) (0.0401)  (0.0325) (0.0330) (0.0353) (0.0387) 
Ln(1+Firm age) 
 0.0551*** 0.0558*** 0.0558*** 0.0455***  -0.0185** -0.0225** -0.0157 -0.0153* 
 (0.0078) (0.0089) (0.0104) (0.0116)  (0.0093) (0.0094) (0.0101) (0.0111) 
Ln(1+CEO delta) 
 0.0068*** 0.0045* -0.0001 -0.0017  0.0097*** 0.0092*** 0.0010 -0.0015 
 (0.0024) (0.0027) (0.0031) (0.0034)  (0.0029) (0.0030) (0.0032) (0.0034) 
Ln(1+CEO vega) 
 0.0038* 0.0042* 0.0039 0.0002  -0.0012 -0.0038 0.0028 0.0025 
 (0.0020) (0.0023) (0.0027) (0.0029)  (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0027) (0.0029) 
Ln(1+CEO tenure) 
 -0.0007 -0.0039 -0.0024 -0.0015  -0.0065 -0.0135*** -0.0063 -0.0007 
 (0.0034) (0.0038) (0.0043) (0.0048)  (0.0040) (0.0041) (0.0044) (0.0047) 
Ln(1+CEO age) 
 -0.0456* -0.0778** -0.0833** -0.0863**  -0.0364 -0.0073 0.0076 0.0250 
 (0.0267) (0.0306) (0.0357) (0.0413)  (0.0321) (0.0327) (0.0350) (0.0385) 
           
Firm fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs.  17,796 15,622 13,513 11,545  18,974 18,015 15,963 13,934 
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Table 9 
Institutional Ownership, CEO Awards, and Innovation 
This table presents cross-sectional variation in the effects of prestigious awards on innovation by institutional holdings. I obtain quarterly institutional 
holdings from Thomson Reuters Ownership Data and aggregate them into annual holdings. Based on the median of the institutional holdings across 
groups, I partition the sample into two groups: groups with high institutional holdings and groups with low institutional holdings. I then rematch actual 
award-winners with benchmark CEOs within each category. Predicted winners (P) are selected by a single nearest neighbor, multiple nearest neighbor 
(not reported), and a kernel propensity score matching procedure (with Gaussian kernel function). I describe more details about matching procedure in 
Appendix B. The last column represents t-statistics of the differences in treatment effects between groups with high and low institutional holdings. The 
standard errors are estimated by bootstrapping and are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
Outcomes  
Low Institutional Ownership (N=462) 
 
High Institutional Ownership (N=307) 
 
Difference (Low-High) 
 
Single Nearest 
 
Kernel 
 
Single Nearest 
 
Kernel 
 
Single 
Nearest  
Kernel 
 
Matching Estimate 
 
Matching Estimate 
 
Matching Estimate 
 
Matching Estimate 
  
Patent t+1 
 
0.0941*** 
 
0.1173*** 
 
0.0734*** 
 
0.0711*** 
 
    0.0207*** 
 
      0.0462*** 
 
(0.0134) 
 
(0.0071) 
 
(0.0213) 
 
(0.0137) 
 
(0.0170) 
 
(0.0103) 
Patent t+2 
 
0.1268*** 
 
0.1342*** 
 
0.0694*** 
 
0.0830*** 
 
    0.0574*** 
 
      0.0512*** 
 
(0.0141) 
 
(0.0071) 
 
(0.0287) 
 
(0.0114) 
 
(0.0212) 
 
(0.0091) 
Patent t+3 
 
0.1201*** 
 
0.1412*** 
 
0.1067*** 
 
0.0996*** 
 
0.0134*** 
 
0.0416*** 
 
(0.0233) 
 
(0.0111) 
 
(0.0306) 
 
(0.0132) 
 
(0.0265) 
 
(0.0120) 
Patent t+4 
 
0.1419*** 
 
0.1396*** 
 
0.1312*** 
 
0.1189*** 
 
 0.0107*** 
 
 0.0207*** 
 
(0.0166) 
 
(0.0165) 
 
(0.0275) 
 
(0.0128) 
 
(0.0216) 
 
(0.0151) 
             
Citation t+1 
 
             0.1509*** 
 
0.1413*** 
 
0.1234** 
 
0.1165*** 
 
    0.0275*** 
 
       0.0248*** 
 
(0.0575) 
 
(0.0223) 
 
(0.0538) 
 
(0.0321) 
 
(0.0561) 
 
(0.0267) 
Citation t+2 
 
             0.1501*** 
 
0.1380*** 
 
0.0942* 
 
0.1357*** 
 
0.0599*** 
 
0.0023 
 
(0.0433) 
 
(0.0227) 
 
(0.0553) 
 
(0.0279) 
 
(0.0484) 
 
(0.0249) 
Citation t+3 
 
 0.2009*** 
 
0.1358*** 
 
0.1302** 
 
0.1115*** 
 
    0.0707*** 
 
       0.0243*** 
 
(0.0457) 
 
(0.0232) 
 
(0.0582) 
 
(0.0220) 
 
(0.0511) 
 
(0.0227) 
Citation t+4 
 
             0.1598*** 
 
0.1154*** 
 
0.0596 
 
0.0906*** 
 
 0.1002*** 
 
  0.0248*** 
  (0.0408) 
 
(0.0207) 
 
(0.0485) 
 
(0.0253) 
 
(0.0440) 
 
(0.0227) 
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